02342nas a2200193   4500008003900000022001400039245009200053210006900145260004200214300001000256490000600266520173900272653001002011653001502021653003202036653002302068100002102091856003602112       2012                          d  a1927-032100aApplying the Theory of the Firm to Examine a Technology Startup at the Investment Stage0 aApplying the Theory of the Firm to Examine a Technology Startup   aOttawabTalent First Networkc05/2012  a23-270 v23 aThe investment stage of a new technology firm is when resources, opportunities, investors, and early customers first converge. Currently, technology entrepreneurs make many expensive mistakes. They invest in assets and develop capabilities that prove to have limited value. They take too long to discover and validate the product-market fit for their firms during the investment stage and run out of time and money. Understanding how theory can help entrepreneurs make decisions during the investment stage is important to accelerate new-firm formation and growth as well as to reduce the uncertainty of founders and stakeholders of technology firms. 
 
This article introduces a model developed to examine deal making during the investment stage of a new technology firm. It is an extension of a model of lateral firm scope proposed by Oliver Hart and Bengt Holmstrom. The extensions come from considering a technology firm as being both a deal-making entity and a pool of resources during the investment stage. A deal is the result of a decision the entrepreneur and others make to coordinate (i.e., work together to achieve a common objective). Benefits from a deal include cash profits for the firm and private benefits for the entrepreneur. 

This extended model is then applied to examine the author’s firm which is still in the investment stage. Application of the extended model to a real-life situation generated two important insights: i) when private benefits include learning from experimentation, the number of deals increases and ii) at the start of the investment stage, private benefits drive deal-making, whereas at the end of the investment stage, cash profits derived from asset ownership drive deal-making.
10adeals10ainvestment10atechnology entrepreneurship10atheory of the firm1 aAyukawa, Michael  uhttp://timreview.ca/article/55601104nas a2200205   4500008003900000022001400039245005300053210005300106260004200159300001000201490000600211520053800217653001700755653001300772653002100785653001500806653002300821100001800844856003600862       2012                          d  a1927-032100aEntrepreneurial Effort in the Theory of the Firm0 aEntrepreneurial Effort in the Theory of the Firm  aOttawabTalent First Networkc02/2012  a13-160 v23 aThis article develops a link between the theory of the firm and entrepreneurship theory to enable the study of employee entrepreneurial behaviour. First, we describe how incomplete contracts permit employee entrepreneurial effort in the theory of the firm. Next, we argue that emancipation offers an explanation for entrepreneurial effort that is not motivated by financial gain. Finally, we show how new technology creates conditions where the boundary of the firm may change and where entrepreneurial effort by employees may occur.10aemancipation10aemployee10aentrepreneurship10atechnology10atheory of the firm1 aHudson, David  uhttp://timreview.ca/article/52101861nas a2200217   4500008004100000022001400041245007000055210006900125260004200194300000900236490000600245520122500251653001601476653001701492653002101509653001701530653002301547653001901570100001801589856003601607       2012                        eng d  a1927-032100aManaging Entrepreneurial Employees Who Bring Their Own IT to Work0 aManaging Entrepreneurial Employees Who Bring Their Own IT to Wor  aOttawabTalent First Networkc12/2012  a6-110 v23 aWhy do some employees invest their own time and money to acquire consumer information technology (IT) for use in the workplace as corporate IT? This behaviour occurs even when their firms already possess considerable IT resources. Moreover, IT governance policies typically oppose the use of unsanctioned IT within the firm. IT governance assumes that the only IT assets that are relevant to the firm are those that are owned by the firm. However, employees can create value for the firm by combining their personal IT assets with the firm's IT assets. Creating novel asset combinations is consistent with entrepreneurship but entrepreneurship theory does not address this type of voluntary employee entrepreneurship using personal IT assets. This article proposes a link between the theory of the firm and entrepreneurship theory to explain why employees act entrepreneurially. This link is significant because it advances the notion that employees of established firms can be entrepreneurial when they use their own consumer IT as corporate IT. This link is also significant because it suggests that managing employee entrepreneurship requires tolerance of value creation that is emergent and can occur within a firm. 10aconsumer IT10acorporate IT10aentrepreneurship10aintrapreneur10atheory of the firm10avalue creation1 aHudson, David  uhttp://timreview.ca/article/633